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I.

Introduction
Partisan redistricting, more commonly known as gerrymandering, is the act of a political

party in power using its majority to draw district maps in such a way that it stays in power or
increases its power.1 The United States Census takes place every ten years as mandated by
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, when the maps for state and national Congress are
redrawn to better allocate representation among the people. Examples of this include the two
cases that are discussed in Rucho v Common Cause, the redistricting case from 2019. In this
case, both the Democrat-controlled government of Maryland and the Republican-controlled
government of North Carolina attempted to cement their majorities by gerrymandering their
maps. For example, in the case of Maryland, those that were drawing the maps attempted to take
the one House seat away that was controlled by a Republican and give it to a Democrat.2 If that
plan were to succeed, then any Republican in the state of Maryland would not have a
Representative in Congress who represents their interests. This is the reality for many areas of
America.
Partisan redistricting is nothing new; in the years following the ratification of the
Constitution, partisan redistricting took place in an attempt to deny James Madison a seat in the
very first Congressional elections.3 The gerrymander itself is named after Elbridge Gerry, who in
1812 approved maps that Democratic-Republicans had drawn to keep their majority.4 However,
as compared to as long as it has gone on, the Supreme Court has only recently taken up the issue
due to the decision in 1964’s Baker v Carr. In 2018 and 2019, there were two major cases that
Tausanovitch, Alex. “The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering.” Center for American Progress,
1 October 2019. Accessed April 5 2019.
2
"Rucho v. Common Cause." Oyez. Accessed February 19, 2020.
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422.
3
Majority Opinion of Justice Roberts, Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 WL pg. 2496
4
Ibid.
1
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were decided in Gill v Whitford (2018) and Rucho v Common Cause (2019). This paper seeks to
analyze these recent cases while proposing solutions to solve the issue. This paper will start with
the values at stake when considering why partisan redistricting is an issue. Then, before
analyzing Gill and Rucho, relevant Supreme Court precedent will be examined to examine how
the two cases came about and the decisions that were made before them. Gill and Rucho will
then be analyzed, including the facts of the cases, the majority opinion in each case, along with
the dissenting opinion in Rucho. Finally, the paper will focus on solutions to partisan
redistricting and tests the Court can use to determine when it is too egregious.

I.

Values at Stake: Voting, Representation and Democracy
In examining the Supreme Court’s decisions around partisan redistricting, we first have

to determine why it matters and the values that matter when analyzing these cases. Why is
partisan redistricting an issue? The idea itself creates systems that hurt and suppress voters
including vote dilution, increased partisanship, and the entrenching of the power of one political
party. Imagine for a second that a voter lives in a district that is heavily gerrymandered. He
identifies with Party A, but Party B has a stranglehold over the district, consistently winning over
60% of the vote. Representative Smith has been Party B’s representative for twenty five years, as
his district consistently elects him and any challenger from Party A doesn’t stand a chance.
Representative Smith never has to listen to anyone in Party A because he is not trying to get their
votes; he doesn’t need to. He can do anything that aligns with his base of voters and they will
consistently elect him with over 60% of the vote. He does not have to compromise and he can
vote 100% of the time on legislation that aligns with his party. This is how partisan
gerrymandering increases partisanship; if Representative Smith never needs to attract voters of
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Party B, he’s free to just be a vote for his party. He never has to compromise for ideals that
matter to Party A. This has pushed his ideology farther to the right or left, whatever his party
aligns with. Representative Smith, in never needing to attract voters of the other side, has been
able to hold his office for twenty five years. His power has been entrenched, meaning unless he
retires or has a challenger from his party, he has a seat in Congress. This seems like an out of
reach hypothetical, but this example is happening in many areas of America that are
gerrymandered. For example, in the 2018 election, Maryland’s 3rd District was so
gerrymandered that the Representative who won the seat won with 70% of the vote. The winner
of North Carolina’s 12th District, which spans most of the middle of the state in a thin line, won
73% of the vote. The Representative who won Louisiana’s Second District did so with 80% of
the vote.56 These are just three examples of an incredibly unfair practice that happens across the
country.
The voters in a district are not fairly able to elect someone who represents their interests.
The ideals that matter when analyzing redistricting cases are democracy, representation and
voting. Democracy is the ideal that the basis of our country was founded upon. The American
Revolution was sparked originally because the colonists did not have representation or say in
what was happening to them in English Parliament. The Declaration of Independence was
written as a rebuke to the monarchy that had chained them while simultaneously declaring that
America would be independent, allowing for the people to choose who would lead them.
Democracy is the foundation for all American laws, systems, and ideas. Justice Kagan explains
in her dissent in Rucho v Common Cause: “Governments,” the Declaration of Independence
Ballotpedia Staff. “Margin of victory analysis for the 2018 congressional elections”
Ballotpedia, n.d., Accessed 13 April 2020.
6
Ingraham, Christopher. “America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional Districts.” The
Washington Post, 15 May, 2014, Accessed April 13 2020.
5
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states, “deriv[e] their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.” The Constitution begins:
“We the People of the United States.” The Gettysburg Address (almost) ends: “[G]overnment of
the people, by the people, for the people.” If there is a single idea that made our Nation (and that
our Nation commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sovereign. Free and fair and
periodic elections are the key to that vision. The people get to choose their representatives. And
then they get to decide, at regular intervals, whether to keep them. Election day—next year, and
two years later, and two years after that—is what links the people to their representatives, and
gives the people their sovereign power. That day is the foundation of democratic governance.
And partisan gerrymandering can make it meaningless.”7 Partisan redistricting denies the people
their democracy by denying the people to choose who represents them. It entrenches partisanship
within Congress, denying the people Representatives who serve their interests and giving them
Representatives who serve the interest of the political party that drew the lines that elected them.
Democracy is potentially the most violated right by partisan redistricting purely because it denies
the founding notions of the nation.
The ideal of representation means that citizens have a right to have somebody who
represents them in Congress; it's why it is called the House of Representatives and why members
of the House are called Representatives. They directly represent the people who elect them. This
form of representation was created through Article One, reading “The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”8
However, this does not mean that the people have a right to a representative who agrees with
them from their district; no Representative is going to legally win 100% of the votes in their

7

Justice Kagan, Dissenting Opinion in Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 WL pgs. 25112512
8
United States Constitution, Article I, Section Two
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district because there will always be someone who disagrees with them. The elections should be
as fair as possible so the people can have someone who represents all of their interests as much
as possible. More competitive elections leads to more compromise and the people getting more
of what they want out of the person that represents them. Partisan redistricting violates this
principle; if the election is safe and the candidate doesn’t need to sway anyone from the other
party, they are less likely to attempt to compromise to sway moderates and voters of the
opposing party. So while partisan redistricting doesn’t break the right to representation by
denying a representative, it denies voters in an area their preference and creates candidates who
stray closer to partisan lines.
The right to vote has been enshrined within the Constitution since the founding of the
United States through the same passage that creates the right to representation. “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the
several States”9 It was later cemented in the Constitution even more through the Fifteenth
Amendment (“the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude”),10 the Nineteenth Amendment (“the right of citizens to vote
shall not be denied on account of sex”),11 the Twenty-fourth Amendment (“the right of citizens
to vote for [federal officers] shall not be denied by reason of failure to pay any poll or other
tax”),12 and the Twenty-sixth Amendment (“the right of citizens who are eighteen years or older
to vote shall not be denied on account of age”).13 United States law, passed by Congress, has also
helped enforce these provisions, specifically the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (abbreviated VRA).

9

Ibid.
United States Constitution, Text of the Fifteenth Amendment
11
United States Constitution, Text of the Nineteenth Amendment
12
United States Constitution, Text of the Twenty-fourth Amendment
13
United States Constitution, Text of the Twenty-sixth Amendment
10
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The VRA specifically targeted states that were denying minority voters their rights in violation
the Fifteenth Amendment, creating blanket, federal laws that prohibited discrimination against
voters who were minorities.14 All of these laws and amendments show how fair voting for
someone to represent the citizens of an area is an incredibly protected American ideal. Partisan
redistricting violates this ideal by denying a fair vote for a candidate who best represents an
area's interest by cracking or packing said area. Partisan redistricting dilutes the votes of people
in an area if the lines are drawn in such a way that denies a majority of people their political
preference.

II.

Two Paths Through Supreme Court Decisions
While partisan redistricting has been around since the founding of America, the Supreme

Court has comparatively only recently taken up the issue. There are two paths through the
Supreme Court that can be considered in the realm of partisan redistricting; they are partisan
redistricting by state legislatures and redistricting by independent redistricting commissions.
Redistricting by state legislatures will be the main focus here, but independent commissions have
a place to be discussed as well. Regardless, both start with Baker v Carr in 1962. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, wrote that redistricting was not a political question and that
the issue could be decided by the courts, as redistricting could violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 The path splits here into the Courts decisions on the two
different kinds of redistricting.
A. Independent Redistricting Commissions

United States Department of Justice, “History of Federal Voting Laws.” US Department of
Justice, Accessed April 2 2020.
15
"Baker v. Carr." Oyez. Accessed September 17th, 2019.
14
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Independent redistricting commissions are attempts by states to use independent reform
to draw district lines, taking the power out of the politicians who reside within the seats. Every
state who has enacted one of these commissions has done so differently. For example, Iowa
completely removed the power from the state legislature and has put it into the hands of the
Legislative Service Agency, which has the power to draw the lines for both Congressional and
state districts without looking at any data about partisan ideologies. Referred to as the Iowa
system, this creates a very fair and balanced map in the state.1617 Other states like California and
Arizona have created independent redistricting commissions which take the power away from
the legislatures and give it to independent commissions made up of the people. Specifically, the
Arizona commission has faced challenges in the Supreme Court. However, the precursor to these
challenges is Gaffney v Cummings in 1974. Connecticut’s legislature had not been able to draw a
fair map for their state, so based on their state constitution, the process was delivered to an
independent redistricting commission. This commission tried to make things as fair as possible
by mathematically calculating partisan ideology and making the districts as fair as possible
through a political fairness principle. The Supreme Court upheld this principle, saying that
political fairness is a valid principle for redistricting.18
While Gaffney was the base for independent redistricting for political fairness, the
commissions themselves wouldn’t be tried until 2015’s Arizona State Legislature v Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission. In 2012 the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission (AIRC) had just finished drawing their new map after the 2010 census. When the

The National Conference of State Legislatures, “The ‘Iowa Model’ for Redistricting.” National
Conference for State Legislatures.
17
Woods, Michael. “Gerrymandering (Almost) Gone Wild: How the Supreme Court Saved
Independent Redistricting Reform,” Florida Law Review, 2016, pg. 1514
18
“Gaffney v Cummings,” Oyez. Accessed November 23rd, 2019
16
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map was submitted, the Arizona state legislature filed suit against the group claiming that the
existence of the AIRC was a violation of the Elections Clause of the Constitution.19 Article One
of the Constitution contains the Elections Clause, which says “elections shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof.”20 Along party lines, the Court decided 5-4 that the AIRC
was a legitimate body as they were created by the people. Justice Ginsburg for the majority
wrote that “The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical record bears out, was to
empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way States enact
legislation.”21 This case is important for a variety of reasons, but the most important is that it
upheld the viability of independent redistricting commissions as a solution to partisan
redistricting. If the Court had ruled the other way, these commissions would be ruled
unconstitutional, forcing the issue into the singular path.
Following Arizona State Legislature v AIRC, another independent redistricting case came
forward to the Supreme Court, also involving the AIRC. Harris v Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission was decided in 2016, again a challenge to the maps that were drawn in
2012. Voters in Arizona claimed that the map that was drawn unfairly packed more Republicans
into the more populated districts and more Democrats into the less populated districts. The AIRC
said that they were drawn this way to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as preclearance was
still a requirement. Preclearance meant that the Department of Justice had to approve any maps
that were made in areas that had previously racially discriminated against voters.The questions in
this case were whether or not drawing districts to over-populate in favor of one party is a

“Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission” Oyez. Accessed
November 9th, 2019
20
United States Constitution, Article I, Section Four
21
Justice Ginsburg, Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,
135 S.Ct. 2652, 2015. Accessed at Westlaw pg. 2253
19
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violation of one-person, one-vote and if trying to obtain preclearance from the Justice
Department is also a viable reason for deviation.22 The Supreme Court in a unanimous 9-0
decision ruled in favor of the AIRC, saying that the reasons for the AIRC having population
deviations were legitimate reasons to deviate from the norm.. More importantly, this case upheld
Gaffney and again reinforced independent redistricting commissions.
The Supreme Court has been kind to independent redistricting commissions in recent
years and has upheld their validity. Independent redistricting commissions are currently the most
viable way to have non-partisan reform; however, not many states have them. As it stands, only
eight states have independent redistricting commissions, with a few more putting the suggestions
on their ballots for 2020. Independent redistricting commissions are the fairest way to redraw the
lines, so why aren’t more states redistricting with independent commissions? Michael Woods for
the Florida Law Review calls it a classic prisoner’s dilemma: neither party wants to create an
independent commission while they are in power. To create an independent commission while
the party is in power will take away the power the party has. When given the chance, both
Democrats and Republicans have redistricted in their party’s favor.23 All of the commissions
have been created through constitutional amendments that the voters of each state have passed. It
is unlikely that every state will follow this example, so voters in these states have looked towards
the Supreme Court for a solution.

B. Redistricting by State Legislatures

“Harris v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission” Oyez. Accessed November 16th,
2019
23
Woods, Michael. “Gerrymandering (Almost) Gone Wild: How the Supreme Court Saved
Independent Redistricting Reform,” Florida Law Review, 2016, pg.1526
22
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However, the Supreme Court has been less kind in recent years to overly-partisan
gerrymanders by state legislatures. In 1964, the Supreme Court decided two other
reapportionment cases, Reynolds v Sims and Wesberry v Sanders. These cases decided that
Congressional districts themselves could be considered constitutional or not (Wesberry v
Sanders) and the Equal Protection Clause requires that states must give Congressional districts
the same number of people (Reynolds v Sims), applying the standard of “one person, one vote”.24
One person, one vote is incredibly important for the issue of partisan redistricting, as it has made
it harder to crack and pack people into certain districts and still achieve the same outcome.
Decided in 1986 in the Burger Court, Davis v Bandemer dealt directly with the issue of
partisan redistricting. Whereas all of the previous cases (Baker, Gaffney, Reynolds) had dealt
with partisan redistricting indirectly or had nothing to do with it, Bandemer was the first one to
deal with partisan redistricting itself. The facts of the case are simple. The state of Indiana
redistricted after the 1980 census and the state’s Democrats filed suit claiming that the partisan
redistricting disproportionately gave Republicans the advantage. In a 7-2 plurality decision,
Justice White once again wrote the opinion. The Court ruled that partisan redistricting is a
justiciable issue and that the district court erred in judgement. On the justiciability issue, Justice
White wrote, “we have repeatedly stated that districting that would “operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population” would
raise a constitutional question,” quoting the political question doctrine that Justice Brennan laid
out in Baker v Carr.25 The plurality in this case ruled on the basis that there could be a solution,
not that there was a solution at the time. The plurality had decided that there was a need for some

National Conference of State Legislatures, “Redistricting and the Supreme Court: The Most
Important Cases.” Accessed September 3rd, 2019.
25
Justice White, Davis v Bandemer, 106 S.Ct. 2797. Accessed at Westlaw, pg. 119
24
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sort of protection against partisan redistricting, but they could not find some sort of solution for
applying the test. They kept the test broad in the hopes that there would be another case that
could discern the features of it.
It wasn’t until 20 years later in Veith v Jubelirer (2004) that the Supreme Court made
another decision on partisan redistricting. Decided by the Rehnquist Court, this case focused on
Pennsylvania’s redistricting after the 2000 census. The Republican controlled legislature created
a plan that very clearly gave Republicans the advantage. Democratic voters filed suit claiming all
kinds of constitutional violations, the only one of which that went through was the one person,
one vote issue. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 4-1-4 plurality opinion saying that they could
not rule on the case because there was not a workable solution under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the issues presented: ““Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it
justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard promised by Bandemer exists. As the
following discussion reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.”26 However,
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the door should not be shut
on the issue yet, as there could be a solution under the First Amendment. “First Amendment
concerns arise where a State enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of
voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views. In the context of partisan
gerrymandering, that means that First Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has
the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters' representational rights.”27 Kennedy is
advocating that there is a potential test that could be found under the First Amendment; this kept
26
27

Justice Scalia, Vieth v Jubelirer. 124 S.Ct. 1769. Accessed at Westlaw, pg. 281
Ibid. pg. 314
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the door open. This Amendment covers partisan concerns and makes sure people have freedom
of association and freedom to choose politically which party they want to support. This takes us
to the cases that were decided in the last few years, Gill v Whitford and Rucho v Common Cause.

III.

Gill v Whitford (2018)

A. A Brief Background of the Facts
Post Veith, the Supreme Court would not make another decision in the lane of strict
partisan gerrymandering by politicians until 2018s Gill v Whitford . The facts for Gill are
somewhat straightforward: Wisconsin elected a Republican majority to its state legislature, the
first time that this has happened in 40 years. The Republican Party in Wisconsin wanted to keep
their legislative majority, so when the time came to draw the state maps again, they chose to
draw them so that they would advantage Republicans in almost every scenario. Democratic
voters from the state chose to file suit before the plan was even implemented, saying that their
rights were being infringed upon. The rights that the plaintiffs said were being infringed were
their First Amendment right to association and their Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal
Protection. The defendants in the case argued that the Democratic voters do not have standing for
the case because as individual voters, they only have a say in whether or not their home district
has violations.28
Something else that is very important to note here is that the challengers to the Wisconsin
plan submitted a formula to show how egregious the partisan gerrymandering was. Known as the
efficiency gap, the test is able, for the first time ever, to quantify gerrymandering into a number.

28

Gill v Whitford (2018), 138 S.Ct. 1916 WL pg. 1920
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How it works is fairly simple, as explained by Nicholas Stephanopoulos, one of the attorneys in
Gill: “To illustrate, take a state with five districts: two won easily by Democrats, 76 percent to 24
percent, and three won more narrowly by Republicans, 59 percent to 41 percent. Democrats
waste 26 percent of the vote in the two districts they win and 41 percent in the three districts they
lose. Republicans waste 24 percent of the vote in the two districts they lose and 9 percent in the
three districts they win. Over all, Democrats get 55 percent of the statewide vote but just 40
percent of the seats, yielding a pro-Republican efficiency gap of 20 percent.”29 This quantifiable
metric was part of the reason that Gill was granted certiorari at the Supreme Court. However, it
was never decided whether or not it was viable due to the outcome of the case.

B. Indecision (Kind Of)
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court chose to dodge all of the Constitutional
questions presented by holding that the Wisconsin Democrats lacked Article III standing to file
suit. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, “The plaintiffs argue that their legal injury is
not limited to the injury that they have suffered as individual voters, but extends also to the
statewide harm to their interest “in their collective representation in the legislature,” and in
influencing the legislature's overall “composition and policymaking.” But our cases to date have
not found that this presents an individual and personal injury of the kind required for Article III
standing. On the facts of this case, the plaintiff may not rely on “the kind of undifferentiated,
generalized grievance about the conduct of the government that we have refused to countenance
in the past.”30 Justice Roberts basically said that voters can’t challenge a whole map on the
Stephanopoulos, Nicholas. “The research that convinced SCOTUS to take the Wisconsin
gerrymandering case, explained.” Vox, Accessed March 31, 2020. https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2017/7/11/15949750/research-gerrymandering-wisconsin-supreme-court-partisanship
30
Chief Justice Roberts, Gill v Whitford (2018), 138 S.Ct. 1916 WL pg. 1931
29
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grounds that it affects every citizen. Voters can challenge their own district(s), as that is what
personally affects an individual voter. However, there isn’t legal standing to challenge the
policies of other districts because one voter doesn’t live in those districts and their vote doesn’t
go towards the individuals running in areas other than their own. The challengers in this case
attempted to challenge the entire map based on how their interests were being challenged in the
legislature, which is not a valid reason under Article III. Due to this, it was also never decided
whether or not the efficiency gap was a valuable test to determine when partisan gerrymandering
was too egregious.
Challenges of this nature are still able to be presented as Constitutional issues, provided
that there is standing. All nine Justices of the Court agreed with this decision but allowed the
case to be remanded so the challengers of the map could attempt to show the individual harm
within each of their districts. The Justices did not want to completely shut down the plaintiff's
claim that they might have some sort of injury, so they allowed the voters to come up with
concrete individual claims that their vote had been diluted. Basically, the Court said that the case
could continue as long as the plaintiffs were not advocating for all districts, just their own. Along
with this, the Supreme Court once again dodged the bullet of attempting to create a judicially
manageable standard to curb partisan redistricting. This case is not super crucial in the pathway
of partisan decisions: it is just another decision by the Court to not make an effective decision.
This case still holds some sort of analytical value. The Supreme Court remanded this case
on Article III standing of only being able to represent yourself rather than others. The map
challengers could not challenge the whole map on behalf of everybody. They could only
challenge their individual districts. This does not make sense; inherently, if a decision changes
one district, other districts would have to change either by gaining or losing part of their district.
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If one district changes, then another has to, and then another. Changing the makeup of one
district changes the entire map in a domino effect. So if one district was forced to be redrawn, the
entire map would have to be redrawn. So while the Court is right in saying that an individual
does not have Article III standing to sue on behalf of others, a statewide map could be challenged
on the grounds that changing one district changes the others. Hypothetically, if the Wisconsin
Democrats were to find one person from each district who was unhappy with the map, they could
challenge the entire map as a whole. This remains to be tested, but this is a potential workaround
to challenge an entire unjust map. However, there is no point in challenging an entire map if the
Supreme Court won’t hear the case.

IV.

Rucho v Common Cause and Lamone v Benisek (2019)

A. Background of the Facts
Rucho v Common Cause and Lamone v Benisek were consolidated into one case to be
decided before the Supreme Court. Both have similar backgrounds: in Rucho, North Carolina
Republicans drew their statewide map egregiously, attempting to gain an advantage for their
party. Challengers of the plan called this an unconstitutional gerrymander. In Lamone, Maryland
Democrats sought to redraw their map to disadvantage Republicans, taking the one majority
Republican district away and ensuring a Democratic victory. This case was also challenged as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Both challengers alleged that the maps were violations of
the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections
Clause, and Article I, § 2 of the Constitution. Circuit courts in both cases ruled that the maps
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were unfairly drawn to disadvantage one party. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases
together and made a decision in the summer of 2019.31
In a 5-4 decision along partisan lines, the Supreme Court ruled that partisan redistricting
claims are non-justiciable under the political questions doctrine. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the
majority joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The dissenting opinion was
written by Justice Kagan, joined by Ginsburg, Bryer, and Sotomayor.

B. Justice Roberts Opinion: An Exercise in Omittance
1. Roberts’ Basic Argument
The majority decision revolved around two connected ideas: idea one is that Justice
Roberts stated that the Founding Fathers knew about partisan gerrymandering and chose to
empower the state legislatures to redistrict as they saw fit. In his own words, Roberts writes,
“The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems and considered what to do about
them. They settled on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures,
expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress… At no point was there a suggestion
that the federal courts had a role to play. Nor was there any indication that the Framers had ever
heard of courts doing such a thing.”32 To back up this point, Robert’s quotes Federalist 59
written by Alexander Hamilton, as Hamilton had said that elections should stay within the power
of the legislature. This connects to his second idea that this creates a political question for the
state legislatures to figure out. Political questions are not suited for judicial resolution and should
be left up to the political branches. They did not rule on whether or not it was constitutional, they

31

"Rucho v. Common Cause." Oyez. Accessed February 19, 2020.
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422.
32
Ibid. pg. 2496
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just said it wasn’t justiciable. Benjamin Battles, the Vermont Solicitor General, wrote for
SCOTUSBlog “Two things the court’s opinion did not do are worth noting. First, the court did
not in any way bless the maps North Carolina and Maryland officials created in these cases.
Rather it described them as “highly partisan, by any measure” and “blatant examples of
partisanship driving districting decisions.” Second, the court did not hold that extreme partisan
gerrymandering is constitutional. Although it rejected the standards the lower courts applied, it
did not seriously question the harms those standards sought to address.”33 The majority didn’t
explicitly say that partisan redistricting was good or bad; rather, they said that because no lower
court or the Supreme Court had found a judicially manageable solution, the issue was to be better
decided by the legislative branches of each state. He writes in his opinion “There are no legal
standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments, let alone limited and
precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral. Any judicial decision on
what is “fair” in this context would be an “unmoored determination” of the sort characteristic of
a political question beyond the competence of the federal courts.”34 He and the majority reasoned
that it would be impossible for the Court to determine a test for what is considered fair.
Therefore, to solve the issue, the legislatures of the states or the national Congress would need to
pass some sort of legislation that curbs their own power.
Justice Roberts and the majority continued to remove the precedent of partisan
redistricting from where it began. In the beginning with Davis v Bandemer, the Court had ruled
that it was probably justiciable to rule on partisan redistricting claims. The Court attempted to
reverse this in Veith, and finally did with this case. However, this case represents planned
Battles, Benjamin. “Gerrymandering symposium: Court to foxes — Please guard henhouse.”
SCOTUSBlog, 28th June 2019. Accessed April 13 2020.
34
Majority Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, Rucho v Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 WL pg.
2500
33
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obsolescence. The majority cut out facts and precedent to fit their own narrative rather than
looking at the whole picture. There are multiple examples of this throughout Robert’s opinion.
2. Omittances and Contradictions of the Federalist Papers
First is the earlier citation of the Federalist Papers. While it is true that Alexander
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 59 that “it will ... not be denied that a discretionary power over
elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded that there were
only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it
must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State
legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ultimately in the former.”35 There is other evidence,
however, that the majority omitted to fit their narrative. The argument that Hamilton is making in
Federalist 59 is that the states should not have the power to regulate their own elections for the
federal House: “Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of regulating
elections for the National Government, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would leave the
existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by
neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs.”36 Hamilton was arguing
that allowing for the state legislatures to decide their own elections could destroy the Union, as
certain states could band together and just not send delegates to Congress, ultimately returning
the United States to the system of government under the Articles of Confederation. Roberts
twisted his meaning to leave this part out of the majority opinion.
This is the only one of the Federalist Papers that Roberts cites, but there are other
documents that would fit to condemn partisan redistricting. In Federalist 57, James Madison
sought out to quell fears about the House of Representatives “putting the few above the many.”
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In this essay, he wrote “I will add a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which
will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of
the society (emphasis added). If it be asked what is to restrain the House of Representatives from
making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I
answer the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws… if this spirit
shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature as well as on the
people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.”37 Madison, Hamilton, and
Jay sought to write the Federalist Papers to convince the people of the United States that the
Constitution was the best form of government possible. They were afraid of tyranny and
oligarchy, and set out to quell the same fears of the people. Federalist 57 is an important
precedent for how the Founders felt about representatives controlling their own outcomes.
3. “Proportional Representation”
The Founding Fathers certainly cared about the power of the people to choose their own
electors. For Justice Roberts to omit entire papers that disprove his argument and omit the
important facts of the Federalist Paper that is cited proves a point about trying to fit the facts to
his narrative. Another example of this is Roberts discussing proportional representation: “The
Founders certainly did not think proportional representation was required (emphasis added).
For more than 50 years after ratification of the Constitution, many States elected their
congressional representatives through at-large or “general ticket” elections. Such States typically
sent single-party delegations to Congress.”38 He also writes, "Partisan gerrymandering claims
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rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a
commensurate level of political power and influence. Such claims invariably sound in a desire
for proportional representation, but the Constitution does not require proportional representation,
and federal courts are neither equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter of
fairness."39 Justice Roberts when referring to proportional representation is not referring to the
idea in the Constitution that people have equal representation in the House proportional to the
number of people in their district (representation by population); rather, he is referring to the
European idea of proportional representation, where districts will have multiple representatives
proportional to the size of their political parties (considered split representation). He takes this
originalist view to make a correct point about how the American people at the time of the
Founders wanted their districts to be represented by one person, via a winner-take-all-system that
is still in effect today.
However, the flaw in Justice Roberts’ argument is that he uses an opposition to the
European ideal of proportional representation to show why partisan redistricting should be
accepted. The systems and processes that have been created through Supreme Court precedent
and Constitutional Amendments, such as one-person one-vote and the Equal Protection Clause
have nullified racial gerrymandering in these single member districts. Later on, Justices of the
Supreme Court (like the plurality in Bandmer, Justice Kennedy in his Vieth opinion, and Justice
Kagan in her Rucho dissent) would apply this logic to partisan redistricting to explain how it
dilutes votes.
Roberts uses a European example of proportional representation to point out that only
one party can win a district. While this is true, it doesn’t make it right for that party winner to
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change their district to make it easier for them to keep their power. This goes against all of the
ideals that matter when electing representatives, including the democracy, representation and
voting . While Roberts’ argument is true that states would send single party delegations to
Congress and that the words “proportional representation” do not show up in the Constitution
(although “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers” does)40, the systems and processes set up in the Constitution represent not
the European idea, but the alternate definition. The Founders attempted to create a system where
the people and their rights were protected by the system itself, making it harder for politicians to
take the power into their own hands. The main example of this in the Constitution is the creation
of the House itself.
The reason that Congress is set up bicameral is so that there can be one house that has
representation by population. The House of Representatives is representation by population
because the people in larger states like California and New York have more representatives, as
they have more people. Smaller, less populous states like Rhode Island have less representatives
that they send to the House. The Senate fixes the issue for the smaller states by giving every state
equal representation in their body. representation by population is why we have districts and the
House. Originally, the Founders were worried about having the larger states have all of the
power in Congress, but the bicameral system was created to solve this issue. The larger states
would have more power in the House, as they had larger populations, but the Senate would have
two delegates from each state so the smaller states would have more of a say. Regardless, with
the passage of the 17th Amendment, the people under this system have the right to vote for their
Representatives and Senators. This system is also meant to protect the people. Common Cause
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in their brief for their case wrote about how the system protects its voters: “Through the
Elections Clause [Art. I, § 4], the Constitution delegated to the States the power to regulate the
‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,’ subject to a
grant of authority to Congress to ‘make or alter such Regulations.’” Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S.
510, 522 (2001). By contrast, Article I, § 2 grants “the People”—and not State legislatures—the
power to “cho[ose]” representatives. Together, these clauses provide a “safeguard against
manipulation of electoral rules by politicians and factions in the States to entrench themselves,”
thus “ensur[ing] to the people their rights of election.” Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015) (citation omitted)." The people’s right to
have representatives who represent their interests are protected under these clauses in the
Constitution The process of how electoral districts were to be decided is also enshrined within
the Constitution. Article 1 § 2 of the Constitution states “The Number of Representatives shall
not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one
Representative.”41
The number of people per district was later changed by federal law,42 but it stands that
the Founding Fathers had a plan for how representation would work per district. The larger
states would not be able to overrun the smaller states in the Senate and the House would be able
to directly represent the people. The system lends itself to the idea that the people have the power
in controlling who represents them. Frequent elections for House members were in place so that
the people could constantly and consistently have a voice in who represents them, mainly to fight
corruption or “having the few above the many.” The idea to fight corruption, as exemplified by
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Madison again in Federalist 57, was to allow the people to vote somebody out of office if they
felt they were corrupt: “the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members of a habitual recollection of their dependence on the people… when they must descend
to the level from which they were raised; there for ever to remain, unless a faithful discharge of
their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it”43 This is what the Founders wanted,
but the times have changed. American society today is divided incredibly politically, so if one
party has an advantage, they want to keep it. It is impossible for the voters who think someone is
corrupt to be voted out of office if district lines are drawn in such a way that the opposite party
has no chance to have their votes heard.

4. Contradictions in Supreme Court Precedent
In debunking Justice Roberts’ opinion on the Founding Fathers as it ties into partisan
gerrymandering, it follows that the second part of his argument also fails. Roberts came to a
logical conclusion: if the Founding Fathers assigned the task to the state legislatures, then
partisan redistricting is a political question. If part one fails, then so does part two. To back up
this point, the views of the Founding Fathers are not the only thing that is omitted by the
majority opinion. The majority also set out to omit Court precedent to fit their narrative. The
majority opinion contradicts itself in analyzing whether or not the issue is a political question.
This is mainly in the discussion about Gaffney v Cummings.
While Baker v Carr was the first kind of redistricting case, the first partisan redistricting
case would be Gaffney v Cummings. Gaffney is cited by Roberts multiple times throughout the
opinion and Justice Roberts contradicts himself whenever it is mentioned. Roberts writes
James Madison, Federalist 57. Accessed in “The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist
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“Gaffney rejected an equal protection challenge.”44 Gaffney upheld a plan that attempted to
achieve political fairness as valid. Justice White wrote “The asserted justification for the
divergences… was ‘the State's policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines,’
a policy we found to be rational and wholly sufficient to justify the district population disparities
of the size and quality that had been found to exist.”45 However, Justice Roberts still cites
Gaffney as precedent that supports his viewpoint, saying that “In upholding [Connecticut’s] plan,
we reasoned that districting “inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences”46 and “[i]t would be idle ... to contend that any political consideration taken into
account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.”47 Justice Roberts
applies his views to this case to explain in his view how the Court has previously allowed
partisan redistricting to occur, saying that redistricting inherently has political consequences and
that Gaffney is flawed precedent that decries any sort of partisan redistricting. This contradicts
the point of Gaffney; the case does not say “partisan redistricting is not allowed,” it merely states
that drawing a map in favor of equality between the political parties is a sufficient reason to
justify different sizes of districts. Roberts equates “equal protection for parties is sufficient for
population differences” to “partisan redistricting is allowed because politics is a viable reason for
population differences.” Roberts’ reasoning is the opposite of what Gaffney intended.

C. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kagan
While the majority opinion focused on an originalist interpretation of the Constitution,
Justice Kagan for the dissenting opinion took more of a contemporary approach that focused on
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tests that would work. She was joined in her opinion by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor. She also starts to pick apart the majority opinion for what she saw as violations of
Constitutional rights: “The partisan gerrymanders in these cases deprived citizens of the most
fundamental of their constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process,
to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives.”48
Justice Kagan writes that partisan gerrymandering amounts to vote dilution, which
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “If districters declared that
they were drawing a map “so as most to burden [the votes of] Party X’s” supporters, it would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. For (in the language of the one-person-one-vote decisions) it
would infringe those voters’ rights to “equal [electoral] participation.”49 What Justice Kagan is
saying is that vote dilution is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Using vote dilution to
crack and pack members of an opposing political party into a district to create an advantage for
the gerrymanderer’s political party infringes upon the right to equal participation in the political
process. Packing and cracking are the acts of putting all of the members of the opposing political
party into one district so the other districts have less members and spreading all of the opposing
members of a party across the districts so they cannot have a majority, respectively. “Whether
the person is packed or cracked, his vote carries less weight—has less consequence—than it
would under a neutrally drawn (non-partisan) map). In short, the mapmaker has made some votes
count for less, because they are likely to go for the other party.”50 Vote dilution also violates the
ideals that matter in redistricting (democracy, representation, and voting). Equal protection in the
political process means that a vote is equal to all other votes, regardless of what party it is cast
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for. Democracy rests on the ability for the people to have their voice and vote be heard, but in a
system that dispenses votes, one voice is worth less than another. Representation rests on the
ability for the people to have trustworthy representatives who can listen to them. Representatives
who use vote dilution and violate Equal Protection for their own benefit cannot be trustworthy to
hold office.
She addresses First Amendment violations to freedom of association and freedom of
speech, as suppression of political parties and representation violate these rights. and “[The First
Amendment] gives its greatest protection to political beliefs, speech, and association. Yet
partisan gerrymanders subject certain voters to “disfavored treatment”—again, counting their
votes for less—precisely because of “their voting history [and] their expression of political
views.” She is stunned that the Court would so boldly violate the ideals of democracy,
representation, and voting that are protected by the First Amendment. Freedom of association
and speech are what make the American political system of democracy work. Without them,
Americans would be living under tyranny, unable to support candidates who line up with their
ideals. This is why partisan redistricting violates the First Amendment: Americans are unable to
support candidates who line up with their ideals. Their votes are being diluted so the person that
they want cannot win. They are being discriminated against because of who they’ve voted for in
the past. They are unable to choose their representatives, violating their ideals to representation.
Kagan doesn’t go in depth into Roberts’ ideas behind what the Founding Fathers intended
when it comes to partisan redistricting. Instead, she quotes the Declaration of Independence and
the Gettysburg Address; “‘Governments,’ the Declaration of Independence states, ‘deriv[e] their
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.’ The Constitution begins: ‘We the People of the
United States.’ The Gettysburg Address (almost) ends: ‘[G]overnment of the people, by the
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people, for the people.’ If there is a single idea that made our Nation (and that our Nation
commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sovereign.”51 She also quotes the
Federalist Papers, specifically Madison in Federalist 37; “[R]epublican liberty” demands “not
only, that all power should be derived from the people; but that those entrusted with it should be
kept in dependence on the people.”52 Kagan also takes the time to explain the differences in
gerrymandering at the time of the Founders and now: the modern abilities of people to make
maps with the technology that is available is so much more precise than the maps that were
drawn at the time of the Founding.53 These quotes are not to counter the majority’s argument
about the Founding Fathers’ interpretation. Rather, it's to prove a point that the foundation of
American government rests on the ability for the people to pick their own representatives.
This is the Constitutional argument she is attempting to make. She cites all of the
precedent in addition to adding decisions the Court has made in 2015 and 2016 with the cases
surrounding the Arizona State Legislature. Kagan writes “The majority disputes none of what I
have said (or will say) about how gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the majority
concedes (really, how could it not?) that gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic
principles”…recognition [of the issue] would seem to demand a response. The majority offers
two ideas that might qualify as such. One is that the political process can deal with the
problem—a proposition so dubious on its face that I feel secure in delaying my answer for some
time. The other is that political gerrymanders have always been with us ”54 Kagan is arguing that
politicians cannot represent themselves and draw their own district lines, as it does not play into
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our foundation of democracy. No politician is going to do anything that would limit their own
power. Seeking a legislative option is next to impossible.
In her opinion as well, she dives deep into the idea that there are plans that work that
would be effective to curb partisan redistricting, providing specific examples of plans that lower
courts proposed and how they would work. Kagan also takes the time in her dissent to outline a
test that the lower courts used that determines whether or not partisan redistricting is too
egregious. If there is a justiciable test that is able to determine when partisan redistricting occurs,
it disproves Justice Roberts’ and the majority’s reasoning that partisan redistricting is a political
question. She explains “As many legal standards do, that test has three parts: (1) intent; (2)
effects; and (3) causation. First, the plaintiffs challenging a districting plan must prove that state
officials’ “predominant purpose” in drawing a district’s lines was to “entrench [their party] in
power” by diluting the votes of citizens favoring its rival. Second, the plaintiffs must establish
that the lines drawn in fact have the intended effect by “substantially” diluting their votes. And
third, if the plaintiffs make those showings, the State must come up with a legitimate, nonpartisan justification to save its map. If you are a lawyer, you know that this test looks utterly
ordinary. It is the sort of thing courts work with every day.”55 In practice, this test makes sense,
it’s politically neutral, and was used effectively by the Circuit Court in both Rucho and Lamone
to strike down the maps. Justice Roberts wrote about what the definition of fair in a partisan
gerrymandering case is; he describes three different kinds of fairness in regards to redistricting
and then goes on to say “Deciding among just these different visions of fairness (you can
imagine many others) poses basic questions that are political, not legal. There are no legal
standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments, let alone limited and
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precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral. Any judicial decision on
what is “fair” in this context would be an “unmoored determination” of the sort characteristic of
a political question beyond the competence of the federal courts.”56 Fairness, by Roberts’
opinion, can never be manageable for the courts because there are so many definitions of what
fair can mean. However, using math, it is somewhat easy to get a definition of fair. Combining
Kagan’s plan with the efficiency gap may create something that has a good definition of fairness.

D. Analysis of Opinions In Regards to American Ideals
It's important to view these cases in regards to the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights that are violated when partisan gerrymandering occurs, but it's also important to remember
the ideals that voters and citizens hold democracy, representation, and voting. Starting with Gill,
are any of these ideals violated by the Court’s decision? The answer is not really. The Court, in
punting the decision to be decided in Rucho, did not make a decision that violated any of these
ideals. In saying that a few voters cannot represent every district, they actually protected the
rights of those voters to be represented. Granted, they could have potentially ended partisan
redistricting as a whole, so they didn’t fix any of the rights that the process already infringes
upon. However, they also didn’t make them worse. The decision basically left the people’s rights
where they were.
Rucho is a different story; all three ideals are violated by the Court’s decision in Rucho.
Starting with representation, saying that partisan redistricting is not a justiciable issue denies
thousands of voters a choice for who represents them; these voters are forced to be represented
by someone who won’t listen to their political beliefs and is less likely to compromise if their
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seat is completely safe. This entrenches political parties and moves both Democrats and
Republicans farther left and right, respectively. The right to vote is violated along the same lines;
there's no point in voting for a preferred candidate if they’re running in a district that they have
no chance of winning due to gerrymandering. This allows candidates who are in the safe district
to spend less time campaigning and less time being accountable to their constituents.
In terms of democracy and voting, this case upends these ideals completely. The people
are not choosing their representatives; the representatives are choosing themselves. Justice
Kagan said it best in her Rucho dissent: “The partisan gerrymanders in these cases deprived
citizens of the most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in
the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political
representatives.” She is describing the violation of rights that are laid out in Article I and the
First Amendment. Article I is the foundation of democracy, as it lays out that we elect
representatives and how we elect those representatives. Violation of this right is one of the most
egregious missteps the Supreme Court has made in recent years.

V.

Constitutional Tests that Would Work

A. How To Move Forward
Although the decision in Rucho would signify that the first path of partisan redistricting
has ended, this is not the case. As the majority says, it is not unconstitutional for gerrymandering
to exist. However, it may be considered unethical by the people that politicians represent. If the
Constitution is viewed as a living, breathing document rather than in an originalist light, then the
times may eventually change to deem partisan redistricting as unconstitutional. To examine this,
it's worth a look at how redistricting currently acts and how it may change.

Schafer 32
There are rules that those who are drawing district lines follow for their map to be
considered legal, split into federal and state laws. There are only two federal laws that
mapmakers must follow: equal population (one person, one vote) and the provisions in the
Voting Rights Act. Equal population means that districts have to have roughly the same amount
of people in said district. The Voting Rights Act protects minorities by denying district lines that
unfairly discriminate against minorities.57 While there are only two federal laws, states have
other protections. Almost all states have a contiguity clause, meaning that the district area can’t
be broken by another district. Most states also respect political boundaries, such as counties and
townships, without splitting them among different districts. Compactness is another requirement
by many states, which means that the higher the population of an area, the smaller the district.58
These state rules are in place to protect the voters' right to be heard and have their vote matter.
The federal rules are to protect against racial gerrymandering. Racial gerrymandering is in itself
a whole other problem, but thankfully, Congress has installed protections against it and the
Supreme Court has ruled that it is unconstitutional for racial gerrymandering to take place. In the
mid-1990s, the Court decided Shaw v Reno (1993) and Miller v Johnson (1995), which decided
that racial gerrymandering does not fall in line with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.
The connections between partisan redistricting and racial redistricting make a case that
partisan redistricting should be unconstitutional as well. Using the earlier example of Maryland
in Rucho, what if the state of Maryland had broken up black areas and forced those that were
black to be represented by someone who was white, unable to represent their interests? Racial
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redistricting is discrimination against a group for being a certain race, which clearly, is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. So shouldn’t discrimination against somebody for their
political beliefs fall under the same umbrella? If a company were to deny somebody a job based
on whether or not they’re a Democrat or a Republican, thats just as much discrimination as if
they had denied somebody a job because they’re a different race. According to Justice Kennedy
in his opinion in Veith, this could be considered a First Amendment violation of the right to
freedom of association. Association applies to political parties as well, as they are organizations
that organize for a political movement. This political movement is also speech, another First
Amendment right. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund wrote an amicus brief supporting the
Common Cause appellees, in which they argued that “Racial discrimination, of course, is
morally, historically, and legally distinct from partisan subordination. Partisan impulses have,
however, repeatedly provided disturbing incentives for officials of both major parties to draw
districts that disadvantage minority voters. The absence of a meaningful partisan gerrymandering
doctrine has not only fostered this abuse, but also led to further detrimental impacts for voters
and for the law.”59 So not only does partisan redistricting supply the ability for mapmakers to
discriminate against those of a certain party, it also allows for mapmakers to discriminate by
race, claiming partisan interests. Kristen Clarke and Jon Greenbaum, writing for SCOTUSBlog,
explain “Nonetheless, [the Rucho decision] will have a negative effect for civil-rights lawyers
and advocates who seek to ensure fair maps. In many instances, it will enable map-drawers who
have racial motivations or a combination of racial motivations and partisan motivations to claim
that they made decisions only for partisan reasons and not for racial ones. The reality is that in
many areas of the country, partisanship and race are closely intertwined. This is particularly true
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in the South, where in numerous places many African-Americans vote Democratic and a
substantial majority of whites vote Republican. Sophisticated map-drawers not only know this
but also can perform sophisticated statistical analyses whereby they can predict election
outcomes based on the racial demographics of the district. Thus, race can be used as a means for
achieving a partisan outcome.”60
However, there is a counter argument to be made. One, the history of slavery and race
relations in the United States make race a much more sensitive subject. Somebody who is
discriminated upon by race has definitely felt the effects more than somebody who is
discriminated against for having certain political beliefs. The reasons that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments originally existed was the protection of racial minorities
from discrimination. Although they have implied protection from the Supreme Court, political
minorities do not have that explicit protection in the Constitution that minorities have. Two, it is
much easier to judge somebody based on their race rather than their political beliefs: people can
most likely just look at somebody to determine their race, whereas they probably have to have a
conversation with somebody to determine their political beliefs. It is much easier to discriminate
based on race. But saying race redistricting is wrong doesn’t make partisan redistricting right. As
Clark and Greenbaum explain, using data for partisan redistricting helps those that want to
discriminate by race. Saying that one form of redistricting for gain is right and one is wrong is
not possible, as they are intertwined. Redistricting by party is inherently redistricting by race in
some areas of America. There are some who use partsianship as a mask for race discrimination,
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being still ruled as legitimate due to the partisan implications. It has never been easier to use data
to discriminate against minorities while still calling it partisan redistricting.
Due to increased levels of technology, it has been easier every year to collect data to
gerrymander maps based on political party. Without that data, politicians wouldn’t be able to
cement their majority. There’s voting records, district history, and previous maps to show how
an area is likely to vote. It has become easier than ever to determine someone’s voting habits.
For example, the Republican Party started their REDMAP initiative prior to the 2010
redistricting cycle with the aim of increasing Republican majorities and protecting the ones they
had. The initiative sought to spend millions of dollars on somewhat competitive races to ensure
that the politicians who were drawing the lines were Republican. Their goals are still on their
website: “The rationale was straightforward: Controlling the redistricting process in these states
would have the greatest impact on determining how both state legislative and congressional
district boundaries would be drawn. Drawing new district lines in states with the most
redistricting activity presented the opportunity to solidify conservative policymaking at the state
level and maintain a Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of Representatives for the next
decade.”61
Vann Newkirk writing for The Atlantic described how the Republican majority increased
based on their efforts; “REDMAP was a spectacular success. First, on the strength of fundraising
efforts in pivotal states with changing demographics—places like Wisconsin and North Carolina
that have become new swing states—Republicans overran 2010 state legislative races in
backwoods districts, to the tune of nearly 700 state legislative seats, the largest increase in
modern electoral history. Additionally, Republicans outspent Democrats by over $300 million in
REDMAP Admin. “2012 REDMAP Summary Report.” REDMAP: The Redistricting Majority
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that year’s gubernatorial races, which netted them six additional gubernatorial positions… all of
which were flipped from Democratic incumbents.”62 The REDMAP initiative is proof that data
can be used to create ways for politicians and parties to create new majorities, discriminating
against those that belong to the other party. Analysis of this data is something that can also be
used to create a test to determine when partisan gerrymandering occurs; this ties in well to the
plan that Justice Kagan proposed in her Rucho dissent and with the efficiency gap. These are the
three things that make a solution that would work: Justice Kagan’s Rucho framework, the
efficiency gap, and technology.
B. A Solution that Would Work
Technology can change the Supreme Court’s decision because it can legitimize a test
through data. This is something that Kennedy wrote in his Vieth opinion: “Technology is both a
threat and a promise. On the one hand, if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan
gerrymandering, the temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional
manner will grow. On the other hand, these new technologies may produce new methods of
analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the
representational rights of voters and parties. That would facilitate court efforts to identify and
remedy the burdens, with judicial intervention limited by the derived standards.”63 Wendy Tam
Cho writing for the Southern California Law Review wrote about Kennedy’s prediction, saying
“Indeed, more sophisticated technology has fueled the threat of gerrymandering. With the aid of
computers and advanced software, map drawers now have the ability to adhere tightly and
meticulously to legal districting practices while simultaneously and surreptitiously entrenching
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power. Moreover, computing power and software sophistication are only improving over time--a
fact certainly not lost on Justice Kagan, who last year wrote in Gill v. Whitford, “[t]he 2010
redistricting cycle produced some of the worst partisan gerrymanders on record. The technology
will only get better, so the 2020 cycle will only get worse.”64 So while technology has made
maps that are uneven, there is already technology that can make maps as even as possible. As
Gill was being decided, a few computer scientists, including Phillip Klein, wrote an algorithm
that allows for compact, mathematical, politically neutral districts. “known as Lloyd's algorithm,
it starts by randomly placing a number of "centers" on a map (the centers might represent
something like a fire station in a resource optimization problem) and then executing two simple
steps repeatedly. ‘For the first step, you assign clients to the center nearest to them,’ Klein
explained. ‘For the second step, you move the centers to get them closer to the clients that you
just assigned. The two steps are repeated until there's no improvement made by either step. When
that happens, the algorithm terminates and you have a stable solution.’"65 This algorithm can be
adjusted to take into concerns such as where voters of a certain party lie and the other rules of
redistricting, such as race or communities of interest, along with voting records and the previous
map to adjust for fairness.
Others, such as Michael McDonald writing for the Yale Law Journal, suggest a
Predominance Test that measures the compactness of a district: “If widely adopted, this test
could reinvigorate compactness as a meaningful redistricting constraint. In a nutshell, the
proposed Predominance Test works in the following manner: first, create a maximally compact
comparison plan by (1) drawing any mandatory districts and freezing them into place; and (2)
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drawing the most compact plan possible for the remaining districts, while respecting equal
population and contiguity. Then, compare districts in the target plan (the plan being analyzed) to
their maximally compact district equivalents. If the compactness of a target district is less than
fifty percent of the maximally compact district, then discretionary factors have predominated
over compactness and a violation has occurred.”66 If these are too complicated, there are very
easy ways to redraw the maps to see if there are better solutions. For example, FiveThirtyEight’s
Atlas of Redistricting allows for readers to instantly redraw the current lines to better suit
Democrats, Republicans, or to make districts as competitive as possible. Their maps use all of
the data and reasoning that those who are drawing the official maps use, while making a very
easy tool to see how areas are gerrymandered.67
Now, combine this with Justice Kagan’s framework in Rucho and the efficiency gap.
Justice Kagan’s test has three parts: “(1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation. First, the plaintiffs
challenging a districting plan must prove that state officials’ “predominant purpose” in drawing a
district’s lines was to “entrench [their party] in power” by diluting the votes of citizens favoring
its rival. Second, the plaintiffs must establish that the lines drawn in fact have the intended effect
by “substantially” diluting their votes. And third, if the plaintiffs make those showings, the State
must come up with a legitimate, non-partisan justification to save its map.”68 For number one,
the efficiency gap is a viable measure for intent. There is a quantifiable metric to show if a map
was drawn in such a way that it disadvantages one party or the other. For number two, history
and previous maps can help to determine how close elections were in certain areas compared to
McDonald, Michael. “The Predominance Test: A Judicially Manageable Compactness
Standard for Redistricting” Yale Law Journal, 7 August 2019. Accessed 13 April 2020
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where they are with the new map. Applying the efficiency gap to previous maps and comparing
to the current map can show how the map has changed. For number three, the algorithm that
Philip Klein and his colleagues created can create a map that does not violate any of the rules or
considerations that take place when maps are drawn. Their algorithm can also be used as a
solution to drawing a map that has been deemed too egregious. This is a test that would work and
is politically neutral.

VI.

Conclusion
The American citizen has certain ideals that they account for as being a part of the society

they live in. These ideals include democracy, representation, and the right to vote. Partisan
redistricting violates all of these ideals, not allowing voters to participate equally in the process,
not allowing voters to choose their representative, and diluting their vote to the point where it
doesn’t matter. The violation of these ideals not only disenfranchises voters, but violates their
Constitutional rights. Citizens have Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, along
with the freedom of speech, expression, and association with their political candidate under the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court for nearly sixty years had protected these rights from
partisan redistricting with their decisions until Gill v Whitford and Rucho v Common Cause. The
Roberts Court in Rucho ruled that partisan redistricting was a political question that couldn’t be
decided by the courts because there wasn’t a test that could determine when violations had
occurred. However, there are multiple tests that could work, including combining Justice
Kagan’s framework in her Rucho dissent, the efficiency gap, and technology.
Whether or not this solution would work in front of the Supreme Court is something that
is up in the air. However difficult it is to beat math and data, the majority of the Court may once
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again argue that fairness is not an applicable measure; but it doesn’t have to be. Being able to
draw a politically neutral map that gets as close as possible to an efficiency gap of zero for both
parties should be fair enough. The Court has not yet ruled on whether or not the efficiency gap is
a viable test to measure partisan gerrymandering, and there may not be a chance to. The Supreme
Court has ruled that partisan redistricting is not justiciable for now; it's hard to determine when a
new case will make its way to the Court if the Justices won’t vote to hear it. It would take the
creation of a new test that piques their interest enough to hear it. For now, the citizens have to
take the power into their own hands by creating independent redistricting commissions.
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